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U.S.  corporations earn a substantial portion of  their income from foreign 
sources. In 1986, the net foreign-source  income reported by U.S. corporations 
on their U.S.  tax returns was over $140 billion, which amounted to over 52 
percent of their total net income.'  Both the United States and the countries 
that are the source of this income generally assert the right to tax it. But U.S. 
tax policy attempts to some extent to balance the U.S.  tax claim against a 
desire to  prevent  double taxation.  This balance,  and  the  overlapping tax 
claims that require it, complicates tax collection by the United States and can 
open various avenues for tax avoidance by  U.S.  multinational corporations. 
Such tax-avoiding behavior would reduce U.S.  tax revenue and could distort 
international financial flows and the international allocation of investment by 
U.S. corporations. An important policy question is to what extent these incen- 
tives for tax avoidance actually affect the behavior of U.S. corporations and 
reduce tax revenue. In this paper, the authors attempt to address that question 
by examining the impact of tax incentives on the way in which U.S. corpora- 
tions structure and coordinate remittances of  income from their foreign sub- 
sidiaries.2 
Rosanne Altshuler is assistant professor of  economics at Rutgers University and a faculty 
research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research. T. Scott Newlon is an economist 
in the Office of Tax Analysis of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. 
The authors are extremely grateful to Gordon Wilson for his assistance in using the Treasury 
tax data.  For helpful  discussions, comments, and suggestions, they thank Sheena McConnell, 
Joel Slemrod, Glenn Hubbard, Harry Grubert, Bill Randolph, Dan Frisch, Jim Poterba, the Inter- 
national Taxation Staff of  the Office  of  Tax Analysis,  and participants  at the NBER  Summer 
Institute Workshop on International Taxation. They are also grateful to Richard Wood and Rita 
Van Buren of Price Waterhouse for generously providing data. The conclusions expressed herein 
are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the position of the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury. 
1.  These figures are from the latest tax return data available, as presented in Redmiles (1990). 
2.  The focus here is on the exploitation of opportunities for legal tax avoidance; we do not 
examine enforcement issues such as those relating to transfer pricing. 
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This study uses new data from 1986 U.S. corporate income tax returns to 
examine the effects of taxes on the patterns of  remittances of  income from 
foreign subsidiaries to their U.S. parent corporations. We focus on the behav- 
ioral effects of three important features of the U.S. tax treatment of  foreign- 
source income: (1) the deferral of tax on the income of foreign subsidiaries of 
U.S. corporations until the income is remitted to the United  States; (2) the 
credit allowed against U.S.  tax  for foreign taxes already paid  on foreign- 
source income; and (3) the limitation of the foreign tax credit so that it does 
not  exceed  the  U.S.  tax  otherwise payable on  foreign-source income and 
therefore cannot reduce U. S. tax  on  domestic income. We  are particularly 
interested in the effects on income repatriation patterns of the global, or over- 
all, limitation that is allowed under U.S. tax law. The overall limitation allows 
the use of  foreign tax credits generated from one source of  income to offset 
the U.S.  tax liability generated by other sources of foreign income. 
Several previous studies have used aggregate data to investigate the effect 
of  taxation  on  the  income  repatriation  activity  of  multinationals.  Kopits 
(1972) used U.S. tax data aggregated by country to estimate a dividend payout 
equation for payments from foreign subsidiaries to their U.S. parent corpora- 
tions. In a subsequent study, Kopits (1976) used U.S. tax data aggregated by 
country and industry to estimate the effects of taxation on royalty remittances 
from foreign subsidiaries. Using aggregate data on U.S.  foreign direct invest- 
ment, Hartman (1981),  Boskin and Gale (1987), Newlon (1987), Slemrod 
(1990b), and Jun (1990) all estimated tax effects on the retention of earnings 
by the foreign affiliates of U. S.  companies and/or the U.S. affiliates of foreign 
companies. A fundamental problem with all of these studies is that the com- 
plex  incentives provided by  the tax  system cannot necessarily  be captured 
using aggregate data. For example, tax incentive effects on income repatria- 
tions from individual subsidiaries in the same country can vary depending 
upon the global tax situation of their respective parents. 
Only a few studies have used microdata to examine the effect of  taxes on 
income repatriation by multinational companies. Mutti (198 1) appears to have 
done the earliest study. He used U.S. tax return data from 1972 to estimate the 
effect of tax costs on the choice of  income remittance channels. Significant 
tax effects were found in estimates of a dividend equation using the underlying 
microdata. Using financial accounting data for the foreign affiliates of British 
companies, Alworth (1988) estimated dividend equations. He found signifi- 
cant effects of tax cost variables on dividend payout behavior. Both Good- 
speed and Frisch (1989) and Hines and Hubbard (1990) used 1984 tax return 
data of a sample of U.S. corporations and their foreign subsidiaries to inves- 
tigate tax effects on their income remittances. Goodspeed and Frisch matched 
data on parent corporations with country-specific information on their foreign 
subsidiaries in an attempt to quantify income repatriation incentives created 
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Hines and Hubbard were able to study income repatriation behavior using a 
data set that matched foreign subsidiary-specific  information to parent cor- 
poration data. Both studies found significant evidence of tax effects. 
We improve on and extend the previous microdata studies in three respects. 
First, we use the most recently available tax return data for a large sample of 
U.S. corporations and their foreign subsidiaries. Second, our specification of 
the tax cost of  income remittances from abroad more accurately reflects the 
tax incentives facing firms. For example, unlike Alworth (1988), we use ac- 
tual company tax data to calculate the tax incentives facing firms. Whereas 
Goodspeed and Frisch (1989) employ foreign subsidiary data that is aggre- 
gated by country, we use a similar data set to Hines and Hubbard (1990), one 
that matches subsidiary-specific information with parent corporation tax in- 
formation.  Unlike Hines and Hubbard, when measuring tax incentives, we 
incorporate the withholding taxes most firms face on remittances of  foreign 
income, and we account for some important variations in source-country cor- 
porate income tax systems. Finally, we investigate some of the dynamic as- 
pects of  the U.S.  taxation of  foreign-source income. We  attempt to reflect 
these dynamics in  our econometric estimates of  dividend remittance equa- 
tions. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.1 describes 
the basic structure of  the U.S. tax treatment of  the foreign income of  U.S. 
corporations and discusses the possible effects of this system on income repa- 
triation incentives and the consequent policy concerns. Section 3.2 specifies 
the tax prices that U.S. multinational corporations pay for income remittances 
from their foreign subsidiaries. These tax prices measure the change in a mul- 
tinational’s tax liabilities caused by  an incremental increase in income pay- 
ments from its foreign subsidiary. Section 3.3 discusses the tax return data 
used in this study. Section 3.4 presents the results of  our analysis of  the in- 
come remittance patterns of the corporations in our sample. The final section 
attempts to draw some policy implications from the results. 
3.1  U.S. Tax Policy Toward Foreign Income 
When a U.S. corporation earns profits from its operations in a foreign coun- 
try, the source country usually gets the first crack at those profits through its 
corporate income tax. The source country may also levy withholding taxes on 
remittances of  income out of  the country in the form of  payments such as 
dividends, interest, rents, fees, and royalties. Like the United States, some 
countries also levy an additional tax, on top of the ordinary corporate income 
tax, on the profits of branches of foreign companie~.~ 
3. The source country may also collect revenue through sales taxes or a value-added tax (VAT). 
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3.1  .1  Deferral 
The time at which the U.S. Treasury first taxes foreign profits depends on 
the way  in which the foreign operation is organized. If  it is organized as a 
branch of the U.S. corporation (i.e., it is not separately incorporated), then 
the United States taxes the profits as they accrue. If it is organized as a subsid- 
iary (i.e., it is separately incorporated in the foreign country), then the profits 
are not generally taxed until they are remitted to the U.S. parent corporation. 
This delay in taxation until a subsidiary’s profits are actually remitted to the 
United States is known as deferra2. 
The deferral of taxation on income earned by foreign subsidiaries is an im- 
portant and controversial aspect of U.S.  tax policy.  Deferral gives firms an 
incentive to accumulate profits in low-tax jurisdictions rather than to repatriate 
them to the United States. Deferral is particularly relevant in this study be- 
cause our data provide detailed information on the foreign subsidiaries of  a 
sample of U.S. corporations. We  do not have detailed information on their 
foreign branch operations. 
Deferral has been attacked for allowing U. S. multinational corporations to 
avoid U.S. taxes on foreign income.by retaining it abroad in low-tax, or tax 
haven, jurisdictions, in consequence favoring foreign direct investment over 
domestic investment. The tax code does contain restrictions that hamper the 
ability of multinationals to permanently avoid tax payments on overseas in- 
come held in subsidiaries. The subpart F provisions of the tax code restrict 
deferral on certain types of unrepatriated subsidiary income by treating it as if 
it was distributed as a dividend. In general, under subpart F, income that ac- 
crues from a subsidiary’s passive ownership of assets (called passive income) 
is denied deferral and taxed immediately. On the other hand, income earned 
from the conduct of a business (called active income) is generally not subject 
to the subpart F rules and is allowed deferral. 
3.1 .2  Foreign Tax Credit 
The United States attempts to reduce the possibility that foreign-source in- 
come could be taxed twice by  allowing a credit against U.S. taxes for taxes 
levied by the source country. The foreign tax credit has two components. The 
first, called the direct credit, is a credit for foreign taxes paid directly on in- 
come as it is received by a U.S. taxpayer. Foreign taxes eligible for the direct 
credit include withholding taxes on remittances to the U.S. taxpayer, such as 
dividends, interest, and royalties, and also income taxes on foreign branch 
operations. The  second component,  called the  indirect,  or  deemed-paid, 
credit, is a credit for foreign income taxes paid on the income out of which a 
distribution is made to the U.S. taxpayer. The deemed-paid credit is available 
to a foreign corporation’s U.S.  corporate shareholders who own at least 10 
percent of the voting stock of the foreign corporation. 
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iary i makes a dividend payment, D,, to its U.S. parent corporation. Since this 
is a distribution of  profits after foreign tax, the United States considers the 
taxable income arising from this dividend to be the dividend grossed up by 
the foreign tax deemed paid on that dividend. The grossed-up dividend is 
(1) 
where TL  denotes the total foreign income tax paid by  subsidiary i and Y,  de- 
notes the subsidiary’s pretax income from the U.S. perspective, which is the 
subsidiary’s book earnings and  profit^.^ Equation (1)  can be rewritten in a way 
that may be more familiar to economists as DJ(l -  TJ, where T, represents 
the average subsidiary tax rate, TJY,,  on foreign earnings from the U.S. per- 
spective. The  U.S.  tax  on the dividend before  the deemed-paid credit  is 
~Dj(1  -  T,), where T denotes the U.S. rate of  tax. The United States con- 
siders that creditable foreign tax was paid on the dividend in the amount of 
~Pj(1  - TJ. The U.S.  tax  liability on the dividend payment is therefore 
D,(T -  TJ/(~  -  TJ. 
The amount of foreign tax credit that can actually be used is limited, how- 
ever, to the amount of U.S. tax payable on foreign income. Therefore, if  the 
foreign tax rate, T,, exceeds the U.S. tax rate, T,  excess credits are created in 
the amount of D,(T, -  ~)/(1  -  7,).  If the foreign tax rate is less than the U.S. 
tax rate, then a U.S. tax liability of D,(T -  TJ(  1 -  T,) accrues, and the remit- 
ted foreign income is said to be creating excess limitation. 
D, + TP/(Y, -  T,)  7 
3.1.3  Overall Limitation and Cross-Crediting 
As noted earlier, the limitation on the foreign tax credit operates to some 
extent on an overall basis. This means that excess credits accruing from one 
source of foreign income can often be used to offset U.S. tax (excess limita- 
tion) on foreign income from another ~ource.~  We  call this cross-crediting, or 
averaging of foreign income. 
Cross-crediting can take three forms. First, U.S. taxpayers can cross-credit 
by  receiving simultaneous dividend remittances from subsidiaries in high-tax 
rate and low-tax  rate countries. Second, cross-crediting can occur between 
income types that tend to incur relatively high foreign taxes (dividends or 
branch income) and income types that incur lower foreign taxes (e.g., inter- 
est, rents, and royalties). Third, cross-crediting can occur over time using 
foreign tax credit carryovers. We  will discuss the third type of cross-crediting 
in more detail below. 
4. The U.S. tax base can differ from the tax base as defined by the host government for a variety 
of reasons. For example, the amount of interest deductions allowed, depreciation schedules, and 
inflation rates may differ in host and home countries. Hines (1989) and Leechor and Mink (1990) 
show that these differences can have important incentive effects. 
5. Until 1976, U.S.  taxpayers could elect to apply their limitation either on a global basis or on 
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The ability to cross-credit can reduce U.S. tax revenue from foreign-source 
income. It may also affect the incentives for income repatriation and invest- 
ment abroad.  For example, if  a U.S.  corporation is in an excess limitation 
position-that  is, the U.S. tax liability on its foreign-source income is greater 
than its supply of foreign tax credits-then  any income it derives from a low- 
tax subsidiary faces additional U.S. tax. The total amount of  tax paid is the 
same as would be paid  on U.S.-source  income. Consequently, the tax rate 
differential between the United States and the foreign country does not distort 
the allocation of capital by U.S. corporations in favor of the low-tax country 
(i.e., capital-export neutrality is preserved).6 However, if  the U.S. corpora- 
tion is in excess credit, say because it has income derived from a high-tax 
country, the excess credits may offset any additional U.S. tax on the income 
from the low-tax country. In this case, capital-export neutrality may be vio- 
lated because investment in the low-tax country will be tax favored over in- 
vestment  in the United  States or in high-tax  countries. On  the other hand, 
cross-crediting may move the tax system closer to capital-export neutrality. 
This is because capital-export neutrality does not hold unless corporations that 
invest in high-tax countries receive refunds from the U.S. government for the 
difference between taxes paid at home and taxes paid to host countries with 
high average tax rates. With the overall limitation, firms that have the ability 
to average high- and low-taxed foreign-source income will be more willing to 
undertake investments in high-tax countries, all else equal, than they would 
be under a per country limitation where cross-crediting is only permitted for 
income derived from the same country. Therefore, under our current tax sys- 
tem, whether or not capital-export neutrality holds depends on the credit po- 
sition or averaging potential of the multinational.  Excess credit parents favor 
investments in low-tax locations over investments in high-tax locations (vio- 
lating capital-export neutrality), while excess limitation parents face the same 
U.S. tax rate on foreign investment projects regardless of their location (pre- 
serving capital-export neutrality).’ 
Such revenue and efficiency considerations have made the appropriate form 
for the limitation on the foreign tax credit the subject of policy debate in the 
past. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, movement to a per country limita- 
tion was proposed in the Treasury tax reform proposal (U.S. Department of 
the Treasury 1984) and the president’s tax reform proposal (U.S. Department 
of  the Treasury  1985). But the desire to restrict cross-crediting  has instead 
been pursued through the application of separate limitations to baskets of dif- 
6. This ignores the possible effects of deferral in violating capital-export neutrality. 
7.  This discussion ignores the role of deferral. Taking deferral into account, Hartman (1985) 
argues that capital-export neutrality holds neither for excess limitation firms nor for excess credit 
firms. He argues that only the host country tax matters for foreign investment financed through 
foreign subsidiary retained earnings. His insight is that the taxes paid to the U.S. government 
upon repatriation of foreign earnings decrease both the opportunity cost of investment (reduced 
dividends in his case) and the return to investment by the same amount and are therefore irrelevant 
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ferent types of foreign income. Before the 1986 act, the period that our study 
covers,  there  were  five  separate baskets:  (1)  investment interest  income, 
(2) domestic international sales corporation (DISC) dividend income,*  (3) for- 
eign trade income of a foreign sales corporation (FSC),9 (4) distributions from 
a foreign sales corporation, and (5) all other foreign-source income, which we 
will call general limitation income. The 1986 act decreased the potential for 
cross-crediting  further by increasing the number of separate limitation baskets 
to nine. Since then, various parties have argued for reductions in the number 
of baskets, generally on grounds of simplicity or competitiveness concerns.  lo 
Taxpayers are permitted to carry excess foreign tax credits back up to two 
years or forward up to five years to offset U.S. tax on other foreign-source 
income. As noted above, these carryovers effectively allow taxpayers to cross- 
credit over time. They also mean that the “true” foreign tax credit position of 
a taxpayer-excess  credit or excess limitation-in  a given year, and conse- 
quently the tax  effect of a remittance of foreign income in that year, may differ 
from what it appears to be. For example, if  a taxpayer is currently in excess 
limitation, then it would appear that a dividend payment from a subsidiary in 
a low-tax (i.e., lower than U.S. tax rate) country would incur an additional 
U.S. tax. But if the U.S. taxpayer will move into excess credit next year, then 
the dividend payment may incur no additional U.S. tax,” because next year’s 
excess credits can be carried back to offset taxes paid in the current year. 
3.2  The Tax Price of Subsidiary Income Remittances 
To  measure the influence of  taxation on  income flows within U.S.  multi- 
national corporations, we derived rax prices for income remittances from sub- 
sidiaries to their U.S.  parent corporations. We  defined the tax price as the 
additional tax liability arising from an incremental dollar’s worth of  income 
remittance. The tax price of sending income back to the United States depends 
on the foreign tax credit position of the U.S. parent-whether  it is in excess 
credit or excess limitation-and  the channel used to remit the income. We can 
differentiate broadly between the dividend channel and channels, such as in- 
terest, royalties, and rents, for which the remittance is tax deductible in the 
source country. Although dividends are not tax deductible in the source coun- 
try, they do get the deemed-paid foreign tax credit in the United States. This 
8.  A domestic international sales corporation is a corporation through which U.S. companies 
can generate export sales. DISCs were created in 1971 to provide a tax incentive to U.S. export- 
ers. Companies that set up DISCs were allowed to defer a portion of the U.S. tax due on export 
income. 
9.  In 1984, Congress effectively replaced the DISC program with the foreign sales corpora- 
tion rules. FSCs are a special class of corporations which are eligible to receive an exemption 
from U.S. taxation on a portion of export income. 
10.  See, for example, Price Waterhouse (1991) and Tillinghast (1990). 
11. Except for the time value of the additional tax paid this year that will be.  offset by a reduc- 
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section presents the tax prices first for dividend remittances and then for other 
forms of remittances. 
3.2.1 
The tax price of remitting income through dividend payments depends not 
only on tax rates but also on the source country’s system for taxing corporate 
income. Our specification of the tax price of dividend payments is similar to 
that of  Alworth (1988)12 and Hines and Hubbard (1990); however, as noted 
earlier, it differs in a few important respects. Unlike Alworth, we use actual 
tax return data to calculate the average tax rate for the deemed-paid credit. 
Unlike Hines and Hubbard, we incorporate withholding taxes, which can be 
significant in magnitude,  l3 and we account for divergences from the classical 
system of  corporate  income  taxation by  some  important countries in  the 
sample, such as the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Japan. 
For purposes of  specifying a tax price for dividend remittances, the coun- 
tries in our sample can be classified into three different categories on the basis 
of  their corporate income tax systems: classical systems, split-rate systems, 
and  imputation systems.  We  discuss the tax price of  dividend remittances 
from subsidiaries under each of these systems. 
Classical Systems 
Under a classical corporate income tax system, the only source-country tax 
consequences of  a  dividend remittance arise from withholding taxes.  The 
source-country tax liability for subsidiary i can be defined as 
Tax Price of Dividend Remittances 
where oi  denotes the withholding tax rate in the subsidiary’s country for divi- 
dends paid abroad and the other variables are as defined above. The foreign 
taxes creditable against U. S. tax liability are deemed-paid taxes plus with- 
holding taxes, or 
If the U.S. parent is in excess credit, any U.S. tax liability on the dividend 
is offset by excess credits, so 
T,,  = 0 . 
And, of course, the U.S. tax price of a dividend remittance is simply 
dT,JdDi  = 0 
12.  Alworth expresses the tax cost of dividend remittances in the form of the opportunity cost 
13. For the countries in our sample, withholding tax  rates on dividends range from 0 to 55 
of retained earnings. 
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If  the U.S.  parent is in excess limitation, then the U.S. tax liability deriving 
from the dividend payment is 
Tus = D,{(T -  T,)/(l -  7,) -  W,)  . 
The U.S. tax cost of remitting an additional dollar of dividend is 
dTuJdD, = (T -  ~~)/(l  -  7,) -  W, . 
Note that this expression is negative if  the source-country average tax rate 
exceeds the U.S. tax rate or if the amount by which the U.S. rate exceeds the 
foreign rate is more than offset by  the effect of  the withholding tax. In that 
case, a dividend payment actually reduces the firm’s total U.S. tax liability 
because it creates excess credits that can be used to offset U.S.  tax on other 
foreign income. 
The global tax effects of a dividend remittance for the firm are simply the 
sum of its source country and U.S. tax effects: 
TG  = Tus  + WP, 
TG  = WP, 
If the parent is in excess credit, this expression reduces to 
because the payment of source-country withholding tax does not result in any 
offsetting reduction in U.S. taxes. The tax price is simply 
dTJdD, = W, . 
If the parent is in excess limitation, the global tax effect is 
T, = D,(T -  ‘ft)/(l -  7,)  , 
and the tax price of an additional dollar of dividend remittance is 
dTJdD, = (T -  ~~)/(l  -  7,) . 
This expression is negative if the source-country tax rate exceeds the U.S. tax 
rate, because the additional credits created by the dividend remittance are used 
to reduce U.S. tax on other foreign income. The withholding tax has no net 
effect because the extra withholding tax paid on the remittance is offset by a 
reduction in U.S. tax of an equal amount. For reference, the tax prices we 
have derived are summarized in table 3.1. 
We  have ignored the effect of the foreign tax credit carryover in the deriva- 
tion of these tax prices. If the parent firm’s foreign tax credit position changes 
during the period over which foreign tax credits can be carried forward or 
back, then the true credit position differs from the position on the books. This 
means that it may be more appropriate to specify the tax price as an expected 
price that incorporates the probability of  changing credit position. Table 3.1 
indicates the direction of the potential error introduced by ignoring the carry- 
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Table 3.1  Tax Price of Dividend Repatriations 
Tax System  U.S. Tax Price  Global Tax Price 
Classical 
Excess limitation parent  (T-T,)/(~  -T,)  -  w,  (7 -  T,)/( 1 -  7,) 
Excess credit parent  0  w, 
Split-rate 
Excess limitation parent 
Excess credit parent  0  Td -  Tu + w, 
(T-T,)/(  1 -T,)  -  w, +  (T-T,)/(~-T~)  + T~ -  T"  + 
(D/Y,)(T~--J(~  -TM~  -T,)~  (D/Y,)(T,--J(~  --W(1--7,)' 
Imputation 
Excess limitation parent  (1 +  O,)[(T -  T)/(  1 -  T,) -  w, - 
Excess credit parent  0  (1 +  Orb, -  0, 
(1 +@,)[(T-T,)/(~  -7,) - 
e,(D/Y,)( 1 -  T)/(  1 -  T,)']  -  8,  8, (D,IY,)(l-  T)/(  1 -  T~  )'I 
Note: These tax prices should be  adjusted to take into consideration the ability of U.S. corporations to 
carry back and/or carry forward excess foreign tax credits. Dividend remittances that increase the amount 
by  which a corporation is in excess limitation (is., with positive tax prices) may be used in the future 
to absorb excess credits if the corporation transits to an excess credit position within the next two years. 
Therefore, the tax price given will be an overestimate of  the expected tax price. Dividend remittances 
that decrease the amount by which a corporation is in excess limitation have a negative current tax price 
that may underestimate the expected tax price if future periods are taken into consideration.  Similarly, 
the current tax price of a repatriation that increases (decreases) the amount by which a parent is in excess 
credit may be  an underestimate (overestimate)  of the expected tax price if  the corporation can absorb 
credits through carrybacks. 
Split-rate SystL*ms 
Several major countries have split-rate corporate tax  systems,  including 
GermanyI4 and Japan. Under these tax systems, distributed profits are taxed 
at a different, usually lower, rate than undistributed profits are. The derivation 
of the tax price of dividend remittances is much more complicated in this case 
because the average foreign tax rate, and hence the dividend gross-up and the 
foreign tax credit,  vary  with the level of  dividend payments. We  leave the 
derivations of the tax prices to appendix A and present only the results here. 
Where the source country has a split-rate system, let T, and 7d  denote its tax 
rate on undistributed and distributed profits, respectively. If  the U.S. parent is 
in excess credit, the U.S. tax price of an incremental dividend remittance is 
still zero, because excess credits offset any additional U.S. tax liability that 
would otherwise arise on remitted foreign-source income. If the U.S. parent 
is  in excess limitation, then the U.S.  tax  price of  an incremental dividend 
remittance is 
dTuJdD, = (T -  ~,)/(1  -  T~)  -  w, + (D,/Y,)(T,  -  ~~)(1  -  ~)/(1  -  T,)~  . 
Note that this is the same expression as derived for the classical system but 
with one additional term. The extra term will be positive if distributed profits 
14.  Germany's corporate tax system is actually a hybrid of a split-rate and an imputation sys- 
tem. However, because Germany provides no refunds of tax on distributions of profits to foreign 
direct investors, the imputation part of  the system does not apply for our purposes. 87  Effects of  U.S. Tax Policy on Income Repatriation Patterns 
are taxed at a lower rate than are undistributed profits. This increases the U.S. 
tax price of  a dividend distribution, because increased dividend distributions 
lower foreign tax payments and thereby decrease the deemed-paid credit. 
When the parent is in excess limitation, the global tax price of  dividend 
payments is 
dT,ldDt = (T -  ~~)/(l  -  T,) + T~ -  T~ + 
(D,IYJ(T,,  -  ~~)(1  -  T)/(  1 -  T,)~  . 
This expression has two additional terms. One of  the terms has already been 
discussed above. The other, T~ -  T~,  represents the net effect of the dividend 
payment on source-country corporate tax payments. For a parent in excess 
credit, the global tax price of a dividend payment is 
dTGldDi = T~ -  T~ + mi 
This price also includes the effect of the dividend payment on source-country 
corporate tax payments. The tax prices we  have derived for subsidiaries in 
countries with split-rate corporate income tax systems are also summarized in 
table 3.1. 
Imputation Systems 
A number of  countries partially or fully integrate the taxation of corpora- 
tions and their  shareholders through imputation systems. However, the tax 
credits generally provided to shareholders under these systems for the corpo- 
rate income tax already paid on distributed profits are not usually extended to 
foreign direct investors. Only the United Kingdom, under the terms of its tax 
treaty with the United States, provides a partial credit to U.S. direct investors 
for its advanced corporation tax (ACT). In the other countries with imputation 
systems, such tax credits are not provided to U.S. direct investors, and the 
incentive effects of the tax system on dividend remittances to the U.S. are the 
same as they would be under a classical corporate tax system.I5 
As under split-rate systems, the tax price of a dividend remittance to a U.S. 
shareholder is complex because the average tax rate used to determine the 
dividend gross-up and the foreign tax credit varies with the level of the divi- 
dend. We  leave the detailed derivation of  this tax price to appendix A and 
present the results here. 
Under the U.S.-U.K.  tax treaty, the tax credit provided to U.S. shareholders 
for ACT on distributed profits is one-half of  the credit given domestic share- 
holders. The United Kingdom applies its withholding tax to both the dividend 
payment and the ACT credit. The United States considers the tax credit paid 
to be part of the grossed-up dividend. In addition, for foreign tax credit pur- 
poses, the United States treats the reduction by one-half in the credit given to 
15.  As noted above, Germany has a split-rate system coupled with its imputation credit. 88  Rosanne Altshuler and T.  Scott Newlon 
U.S. shareholders as an additional payment of U.K.  corporate income tax by 
the U.S. subsidiary. 
If we denote the tax credit given to U.S. shareholders for ACT as 0,, then 
for U.S. parents in excess limitation the U.S. tax price to the parent of a divi- 
dend remittance from a U. S,  subsidiary is 
dT,JdD,  = (1 + 0,) {(T -  ~~)/(1  -  T,) - 
w, - OL(D,/YJ(l  -  ~)/(1  -  T,)~}  . 
If  the U.S. parent is in excess credit, then the U.S.  tax price to the parent is 
zero. 
The global tax price for a parent in excess limitation is 
dT,/dD,  = (1 + 0,){(~  -  TJ/(I  -  TJ -  0,(D/Y,)(l -  T)/( 1 -  T~)~}  -  Ol 
If the U.S. parent is in excess credit, then the global tax price is 
dT,/dD,  = (1 + 0,)w, - 0, . 
The third panel of  table 3.1 summarizes the tax prices we have derived for 
subsidiaries in countries with imputation systems. 
3.2.2 
Rent, royalty, and interest payments from subsidiaries to their U.S. parent 
corporations are generally deductible against corporate income tax  in  the 
source country.  l6  Each dollar remitted through one of these channels therefore 
saves T, dollars in source-country tax,  although there is  likely also to be  a 
withholding tax on such payments. At the same time, there is no deemed-paid 
credit for such payments. This leads to the following net global tax prices: 
T -  T, if  the U.S. parent is in excess limitation, wi -  T~ if  the parent is in 
excess credit. 
From subsidiaries facing high source-country tax rates, multinationals gen- 
erally have  an  incentive to receive income remittances in  one of  the  tax- 
deductible forms rather than in the form of dividends. A tax-deductible remit- 
tance decreases source-country tax payments directly, whereas dividend pay- 
ments might only produce unusable excess credits. If withholding tax rates on 
the tax-deductible forms of payment are not substantially higher than they are 
on dividends, the incentive to make payments in these tax-deductible forms is 
especially strong when the parent is in excess credit. The excess credits can 
be used to offset any residual U.S. tax on these payments, and the dominant 
effect is the deductibility of the payments against source-country taxes. 
Tax Price for Tax-deductible Remittances 
16. There are exceptions. For example, Brazil does not allow the deductibility of  royalty pay- 
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3.3  The Data 
To comply with the U.S. tax law, U.S. multinationals must file a number of 
tax and information forms. We  created a data set from information obtained 
from three sets of these forms filed by  U.S. taxpayers in 1986: corporate in- 
come tax returns filed by nonfinancial U. s.  corporations,  l7 called 1 120 forms; 
forms filed in support of foreign tax credits claimed, called 1  11  8 forms; and 
information returns, called 5471 forms, filed for each controlled  foreign cor- 
poration (CFC) controlled by a U.S. taxpayer. A CFC is a foreign corporation 
that  is at least 50 percent owned by  a group of  U.S. shareholders each of 
whom has at least a 10 percent interest in the company. Form 1120 contains 
firm-specific tax return data that includes U.S. taxable income, U.S. taxes 
paid, tax credits claimed, and balance sheet and income statement items. In- 
formation on foreign-source income, foreign taxes paid, and foreign tax cred- 
its claimed by  foreign tax credit basket is reported on Form 11 18. This form 
also provides us with data on foreign-source income and foreign taxes paid 
for the general limitation income basket which is the focus of this study. The 
CFC data from Form 5471 includes balance sheet and income statement vari- 
ables along with detailed information on remittances to U.S. parent corpora- 
tions. 
Our full sample contains 617 U.S. parent corporations, 277 of which had 
nonpositive worldwide income in  1986.18 Each  parent in  our sample con- 
trolled at least one CFC and filed a Form 11  18 to claim a foreign tax credit in 
the general limitation income basket.19 In relation to the entire universe of 
nonfinancial corporations, our sample contains only 31 percent of total assets. 
However, 92 percent of  foreign tax credits in  1986 are claimed by parents in 
our sample, and this proportion increases to 95 percent if  we  consider only 
manufacturing parents. The majority of the parents in the sample were in the 
manufacturing industry  (71.5 percent),  followed by  retail trade (1 1.2 per- 
cent), transportation (7.9 percent), services (5.0 percent), mining (2.6 per- 
cent), construction (1.5 percent), and agriculture (0.3 percent).zo 
17. Financial  companies face some different tax  rules, and  they generally operate in other 
countries through branches rather than subsidiaries. For these reasons, financial companies were 
omitted from the analysis. 
18.  The firms in our sample were drawn from the sample collected by the Statistics of lncome 
Division of the Internal Revenue Service. This sample was created by including all U.S. corpora- 
tions with assets that exceeded $50 million and a subset of U.S. corporations with smaller asset 
size. A complete description of the sampling technique used by the Internal Revenue Service can 
be found in Statistics of Income Corporation Income Tax Returns, 1986 volume. 
19.  Because we are concerned primarily with CFC income repatriations,  we eliminated from 
our sample parents that did not have general limitation income and parents that did not own any 
CFCs. The original sample contained  1,817 nonfinancial parent corporations. More than half of 
those eliminated from our study had no CFCs (I,  101); the remainder either had not filed a foreign 
tax credit form (97) or had no general limitation basket foreign-source income (2). Removing 
multinationals that did not control any CFCs from our sample resulted in only a 7 percent reduc- 
tion in general limitation basket foreign-source income. 
20.  These percentages are calculated for parents with positive worldwide income. 90  Rosanne Altshuler and T.  Scott Newlon 
The CFC data set provides information detailing income remittances to 
U.S. parent corporations for the top 7,500 CFCs in terms of asset size in 1986. 
The U.S. parent corporations in our sample accounted for 6,121 of these large 
CFCs. Compared to the entire set of subsidiaries owned by our parents, these 
6,121 CFCs accounted for 91.5 percent of assets and 93.0 percent of earnings 
and profits both before and after taxes. 
Calculating CFC-specific tax prices for income remittances requires knowl- 
edge of both the appropriate foreign corporate tax rate and the withholding tax 
rate. We  used the CFC's average foreign tax rate (foreign tax payments di- 
vided by  before-tax earnings and profits both taken from Form 5471) to mea- 
sure the rate T,  at which dividends are grossed up and foreign tax credits cre- 
ated.  Under  some circumstances, calculating the  average tax  rate  in  this 
manner may lead to an unsatisfactory approximation of T~.  In particular, prob- 
lems arise when CFCs report negative earnings and profits, receive tax re- 
funds from host countries, repatriate dividends in excess of current earnings 
and profits, and receive dividends from subsidiaries of their own. Appendix B 
describes how we handled CFCs in those situations. 
Foreign withholding taxes on dividend remittances can affect the overall tax 
cost of repatriations and were therefore included in our tax price specification. 
We  used Price Waterhouse guides and tax treaties to develop a list of country- 
specific withholding tax rates for  1986. The Price Waterhouse guides also 
provided the appropriate statutory tax rates for the countries in  our sample 
with split-rate and imputation tax systems. 
3.4  Results 
3.4.1  Tax Payments and Income Remittance Patterns 
Table 3.2 presents summary information on the income of  the 340 U.S. 
parent corporations in our sample that had positive taxable income and on the 
taxes that they paid. The columns of the table present figures for the number 
of  U.S. corporations in our sample and the book value of  their assets, their 
U.S. total taxable income, the total U.S. taxes they paid after tax credits, their 
foreign-source income, the U.S. taxes they paid on foreign-source income, 
and the average U.S. tax rate on their foreign-source income. The rows of the 
table present industry totals, totals for firms in excess limitation and excess 
credit, and totals for all U.S. parent corporations in the sample, respectively. 
Table 3.2 shows that U.S. tax collections on foreign-source income varied 
considerably by industry in our sample. Corporations in agriculture, transpor- 
tation, and to a lesser extent service industries paid more U.S. taxes on their 
foreign-source income than did companies in the other industries we  con- 
sider.21  For example, the average U.S. tax paid on a dollar of income earned 
2 I. This result is possibly of  limited significance for agriculture,  because there is only one 
corporation in that industry present in our sample. Confidentiality considerations required us to Table 3.2  Tax Payments of U.S. Parent Corporations in the Sample ($ millions) 
~  ~~~~~  ~ 
Number of  Total U.S.  Total U.S.  U.S. Taxes Paid  Average U.S. Tax 
U.S. Parent  Taxable  Taxes  Foreign-Source  on Foreign-Source  Rate on Foreign- 
Corporations  Assets  Income  Paid  Income  Income  Source Income 
Total 









































































*The authors combined the agriculture and transportation industries to preserve the confidentiality of the tax return information. These two industries have 
similar average U.S. tax rates on their foreign-source income. 92  Rosanne Altshuler and T. Scott Newlon 
abroad was over 33 cents in the agricultural and transportation industries but 
less than 3 cents in manufacturing industries. The fact that corporations in the 
transportation and service industries pay lower foreign taxes on their foreign- 
source income and consequently have higher U.S. tax liabilities on that in- 
come is unsurprising. In many countries, income from the transportation and 
services activities of foreign companies is exempt from tax or is lightly taxed, 
either as a matter of domestic law or as a consequence of tax treaty provisions. 
Table 3.2 also shows that, despite industry variation, most of  the foreign- 
source income of  the U.S. parent corporations in the sample bore little U.S. 
tax. For the sample as a whole, foreign-source income was a large percentage 
(59.0) of total U.S. taxable income, but the U.S. taxes paid on this income 
were small, both as a percentage of total U.S. taxes paid (10.7) and as a per- 
centage of foreign-source income (3.4). Apparently, the U.S. corporations in 
the  sample  were  able to offset  most  potential  U.S.  tax  liability  on  their 
foreign-source income with credits for the foreign taxes they paid, or were 
deemed to have paid, on that income. This was definitely the case for those 
U.S.  parents that were in excess credit, and although most (62 percent) of the 
U.S. parents in the sample were in excess limitation, most (69 percent) of the 
foreign-source income accrued to firms in excess credit. Even the U.S. par- 
ents in excess limitation paid relatively little U.S. tax on their foreign-source 
income, since the average U.S. tax rate on that income was less than 11 per- 
cent. 
The fact that most of  the foreign-source income of  these firms bore little 
U.S. tax did not necessarily result from specific tax avoidance activities on 
their part. It could have arisen simply because tax rates were high in the juris- 
dictions in which most foreign income was earned and hence firms that re- 
ceived substantial foreign-source income were likely to be in excess credit. 
Table 3.3 presents some evidence bearing on this point. 
Table 3.3 presents information for CFCs associated with parents that had 
positive  worldwide income in  1986. CFCs are split into two groups: those 
with U.S. parents in excess limitation and those with U.S.  parents in excess 
credit. Within each of these groups, the CFCs are classified by the average 
foreign tax rate they faced. The columns of table 3.3 present information on 
CFC assets, CFC after-foreign-tax earnings, and the different forms of  U.S. 
taxable  foreign-source  income  the  parent  corporations  derived  from  the 
CFCS.~~  Although our original sample contained 6,121 CFCs, 1,646 were as- 
sociated with parents that  had tax losses in  1986. Of the remaining 4,475 
CFCs, 3,410 had sufficient information to calculate average foreign tax rates 
report the figures for that corporation  grouped  with the transportation  industry, which faced a 
similar average U.S. tax rate on its foreign-source income. 
22.  The total foreign-source  income in table 3.3 is smaller than in table 3.2 for at least two 
reasons.  First, foreign sources of  income other than CFCs, such as branch operations, are not 
included.  Second, the sample of  CFCs does not necessarily represent all the CFCs of the U.S. 
firms in the sample. Table 3.3  Foreign Tax Rates and the Composition of U.S. Parent Corporation Income from CFCs in the Sample ($ millions) 
Income from CFCs 
CFC 
Number of  CFC  After-tax  Interest, Rents,  Subpart F 
CFCs  Assets  Earnings  Dividends  and Royalties  Income  Total 
U.S. parent in excess limitation 
Total 
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and are therefore included in table 3.3. As mentioned in section 3.3 and de- 
tailed in Appendix B, in some circumstances we did not have the appropriate 
information to calculate a CFC-specific tax rate. 
The table shows that the assets and after-tax earnings of CFCs in the sample 
are distributed unevenly  across foreign tax rates for both excess credit and 
excess limitation parents. There are concentrations of assets and earnings in 
the lowest (less than 20 percent) and middle (30-50  percent) tax rate ranges. 
This suggests that the parent corporations’ low U.S. tax liabilities on foreign 
income may be due more to cross-crediting than to generally high foreign tax 
rates. 
Table 3.3 shows that CFC dividend payments were distributed across for- 
eign tax rates in much the same way as CFC earnings and assets were. This 
indicates that significant cross-crediting may be occurring, but whether it is 
by design or simply due to the distribution of tax rates on the earnings of these 
CFCs is not clear. The table does show some evidence of  tax influences on 
dividend remittances. First, CFCs with parents in excess credit pay out rela- 
tively more as a percentage of assets or earnings than do other CFCs. One 
would expect this, since dividend payments from those CFCs incur no addi- 
tional  U.S.  tax.  Second, dividend remittances  of  high-tax  CFCs of  excess 
limitation parents generally bear a negative tax price, and those CFCs do pay 
out much more in relation  to their earnings than do other CFCs of  excess 
limitation parents. However, this last result does not hold when dividend pay- 
ments are expressed as a percentage of CFC assets. Furthermore, one might 
expect high-tax  CFCs of parents in excess limitation to have higher payout 
ratios than do CFCs with parents in excess credit-since  in the former case 
the tax price of a dividend remittance is generally negative, while in the latter 
case it is at least zero-but  the figures in table 3.3 suggest otherwise. 
Table 3.3 does not provide any conclusive evidence for substantial tax influ- 
ences on CFC dividend remittance patterns. But it should be remembered that 
we have ignored withholding taxes and variations in host country corporate 
tax systems here. As we show below, these turn out to be important. 
Evidence that U.S.  multinational corporations use different channels for 
income remittances in order to reduce their global tax liabilities is provided in 
table 3.3.  Remitting income through the interest, rents, and royalties channels 
instead of the dividend channel takes advantage of the deductibility of  such 
payments against the CFC’s taxes. Therefore, we would expect to see rela- 
tively  more of  these  forms of  remittances  from  CFCs facing high  source- 
country tax rates. Table 3.3 shows that pattern of remittances. Relatively more 
interest, rents, and royalties were paid from the CFCs with higher foreign tax 
rates than from those with lower foreign tax rates-although  there is some 
concentration of payments in the lowest tax rate range. When these remit- 
tances are measured in relation to CFC assets or earnings, the concentration 
in the upper tax rate ranges appears particularly pronounced. CFCs with par- 
ents in  excess credit also remitted substantially  more income in these tax- 95  Effects of  U.S. Tax Policy on Income Repatriation Patterns 
deductible forms than did those with parents in excess limitation. This makes 
sense, because these firms are effectively averaging the excess credits created 
from other sources of foreign income to offset the additional U.S. tax liability 
generally created by interest, rent, and royalty  payment^.^^ 
The distribution,of subpart F income by  CFC tax rate, as shown in table 
3.3, illustrates the value of deferral to U. S. multinational corporations. The 
vast majority of this income was accounted for by CFCs facing low tax rates. 
Although there is no deferral for it, subpart F income may be earned on pas- 
sive investments of retained active CFC income that does benefit from defer- 
ral. U.S.  multinationals may choose to retain this active income in low-tax 
jurisdictions and earn subpart F income on it until such time as excess credits 
are available from elsewhere to offset the residual U. S.  tax liability that would 
accrue if the active income were sent back immediately to the United States. 
3.4.2  Cross-Crediting 
Table 3.3 shows that the most important channel for income remittances 
from CFCs was  through  dividend payments.  Dividend payments made up 
about 62 percent of the total foreign income derived by U.S.  parents from the 
CFCs in the sample. And this understates the importance of dividends in the 
net receipts of  the parent, because they are paid out of  after-foreign-tax in- 
come and so get the deemed-paid credit, whereas interest, rents, and royalties 
are paid out of pre-foreign-tax income and do not get the deemed-paid credit. 
Therefore, much of the scope for tax minimization by U.S. parents may lie in 
coordinating CFC dividend payments properly. CFC dividend payment levels 
should also be easier to change in the short run than are the levels of interest, 
royalties, and rents. Thus dividends are particularly suitable for taking advan- 
tage of  the ability to cross-credit provided by  the overall limitation on the 
foreign tax credit. The question is how much U.S. corporations do use divi- 
dend payments in this way to reduce their tax liabilities, given that other fac- 
tors may drive dividend remittance patterns as well. 
Table  3.4 partitions the data in a way  that may indicate the potential for 
cross-crediting through concurrent dividend payments from CFCs facing dif- 
ferent levels of foreign taxation, and to some extent how much of that poten- 
tial is realized. For this table, CFCs are classified as high-tax if their average 
foreign tax rate is greater than or equal to the U.S. statutory rate in 1986 (46 
percent) and as low-tax otherwise. Dividends from a high-tax CFC would tend 
to create excess credits or offset U.S.  tax on other foreign-source income, 
whereas dividends from a low-tax CFC would tend to create a U.S. tax liabil- 
23. The analysis in  Goodspeed and Frisch (1989) also suggests that parents average across 
income sources. The authors calculate average tax rates on all types of foreign-source income in 
the general limitation basket by country, using 1984 data. They find that the effective tax rate on 
dividends was high, while the effective tax rate on interest and other forms of deductible income 
repatriations was low. Comparing these effective tax rates with country-specific  average tax rates 
suggests that parents cross-credit over foreign-source income types. Table 3.4  The Potential for and Extent of Cross-Crediting  in CFC Dividend Remittances to U.S. Parent Corporations  in the Sample 
Percentage of 
Percentage of  Number  Total Number  Dividends  Percentage of 
Total  Receiving  Received  Received  Total Dividends 
Number  Number  Dividends  Dividends  ($ millions)  Received 
~~ 
Total U.S. parent corporations  290  100.0%  204  100.0%  $12,267  100.0% 
With dividends received from both high- and low-tax CFCs  11 1  38.3  111  54.4  1 1,488  93.7 
With dividends received only from low-tax CFCs  26  9.0  26  12.7  220  1.8 
Parent also has FTC canyforwards  11  3.8  11  5.4  146  1.2 
U.S. parents with both high- and low-tax CFC  212  73.1  171  83.8  11,905  97.0 
With dividends received only from high-tax CFCs  34  11.7  34  16.7  196  1.6 
Nore: CFCs with average foreign tax rates greater than or equal to the U.S. statutory corporate rate in 1986 (46 percent) are classified as high-tax CFCs; all 
other CFCs for which an average foreign tax rate can be calculated are low-tax CFCs. 97  Effects of U.S. Tax  Policy on Income Repatriation Patterns 
ity or absorb excess foreign tax credits.24  As was the case with table 3.3, to 
construct this table we had to eliminate CFCs for which we did not have suf- 
ficient information to calculate average tax rates. Parents that did not control 
any CFCs for which we would compute an average tax rate were eliminated 
from the sample. As a result, our original sample of 340 parents with positive 
worldwide income was reduced to 290 parents. Of the 290 parent firms in the 
new  sample, 212, or about 73 percent, had both high-tax and low-tax CFCs 
in our sample; these U.S.  parents therefore had the potential to cross-credit 
through concurrent dividend payments from high- and low-tax CFCs. The 
table also shows that most (54.4 percent) of the parents receiving dividends 
received them from both high- and low-tax CFCs, and these parents accounted 
for the bulk (93.7 percent) of dividends received. Clearly, most of the parents 
with the potential to cross-credit did so, at least to some extent. About  17 
percent of the parents receiving dividends from CFCs had both high- and low- 
tax CFCs but  received dividend payments only from their high-tax CFCs. 
However, these dividends accounted for only 1.6 percent of  total dividends 
received by U.S.  parents in the sample. The bottom two rows of  table 3.4 
provide information on parents that had both high- and low-tax CFCs but re- 
ceived dividends only from their low-tax CFCs. These parents accounted for 
12.7 percent of all parents but only 1.8 percent of total dividends received by 
parents from CFCs. In addition, the bottom row shows that about two-thirds 
of those dividends were received by parents with foreign tax credit carryovers 
that they could use to offset at least some of the additional U.S. tax liability 
that might otherwise arise on the dividend remittances  .2J 
In addition to cross-crediting through concurrent remittances of foreign in- 
come from differently taxed sources, firms can use the ability to carry foreign 
tax credits back two years and forward five years to cross-credit over time. It 
appears that the use of these carryovers is not insignificant. The U.S. corpo- 
rations in our sample carried over $4 billion worth of foreign tax credits into 
1986 from previous years.26  About 40 percent of these carryovers were used 
to offset U.S. tax on foreign-source income in 1986. 
We  cannot measure the full extent of cross-crediting over time because we 
do not have data on the amount of excess foreign tax credits created in 1986 
which were carried back to offset tax liabilities in previous years or forward to 
offset tax in the future. (Note that a carryover created in 1986 would not have 
expired before 1991  .) We do know, however, that foreign tax credit carryovers 
could only be of use to a firm in excess credit in 1986 if that firm was in excess 
24.  This will not always be true, because we are ignoring here the withholding tax rates and 
variations in foreign corporate tax systems that we account for below. 
25. The figures presented in table 3.4  probably underestimate the potential for cross-crediting 
in concurrent dividend payments, and its actual use. Our sample does not include all the CFCs of 
each parent firm, for two reasons. First, as explained above, only the largest 7,500 CFCs were 
included in the sample. Second, as explained in the text and in appendix B, some CFCs were 
dropped from the sample because average tax rates could not be calculated for them. 
26.  The figures reported in this paragraph are not presented in a table. 98  Rosanne Altshuler and T. Scott Newlon 
limitation for at least one of  the previous two years or moved into excess 
limitation before  1991. In general, the more frequently firms change their 
credit position, the more likely they are to be able to use these carryovers. In 
an effort to determine to what extent firms move between excess credit and 
excess limitation, we created a panel data set from tax return data for a sample 
of  U.S. corporations. Unfortunately, data from foreign tax credit forms are 
compiled only in even years and were available to us only for the years 1980, 
1982, 1984, and  1986. In addition, U.S. corporations generally file foreign 
tax credit forms only in years in which they claim a credit; as a result, the data 
are missing for parents with nonpositive worldwide income. In an effort to 
obtain the largest number of  observations, we created three data sets that 
match tax returns over three-year periods. There were 449 U.S. corporations 
in the sample that linked the 1980 and 1982  tax returns, 388 in the sample that 
linked 1982 and 1984 returns, and 317 in the sample that linked returns from 
1984 and 1986. 
Table 3.5 presents our estimates of  the percentage of  firms that switched 
credit position over time. We  divided the parents into four groups: those that 
were in excess limitation during the three-year time period under considera- 
tion, those that were always in excess credit, those that moved from excess 
credit to excess limitation during the time period, and those that transited from 
excess limitation to excess credit. To  classify firms into these cells, we first 
determined their credit status in the two even years and then checked for the 
presence of  foreign tax credit carryforwards in  the most recent year of  the 
sample under consideration. For example, a firm that was in excess limitation 
in 1984 and 1986 and that did not claim a foreign tax credit carryforward in 
1986 was placed in the “always in excess limitation” cell. If  the same firm 
claimed a foreign tax credit carryforward in 1986, it was placed in the “transit 
from excess credit to excess limitation” cell because the presence of  the car- 
ryforward indicates that this firm was in excess credit in the previous year. 
Using this methodology, we developed what should be considered floor esti- 
mates of the extent to which firms switched credit position.*’ We  present both 
unweighted estimates and figures that are weighted by  assets and foreign- 
source income for the last even year of each sample. 
Table 3.5 demonstrates that a significant number of firms transited both into 
27.  To divide the firms into the four cells that appear in  table  3.5, we used the following 
methodology. For simplicity, we use the 1984-86  time period as an example. Firms that were in 
excess credit in 1984 and 1986 and that had foreign tax credit carryforwards in 1986 were placed 
in the “always in excess credit” cell. Firms that were in excess limitation in 1984 and 1986 and 
that did not have foreign tax credit carryfonvards in 1986 were placed in the “always in excess 
limitation” cell. The set of firms that were in excess credit in 1984 and in excess limitation in 1986 
were determined to have transited out of an excess credit state over the time period. We added to 
this group (the “transit from excess limitation to excess credit” cell) firms that were in excess 
limitation in both even years and that had foreign tax credit carryforwards in 1986. The final cell, 
“transit from excess limitation to excess credit,” contains the following two groups of firms: those 
in excess limitation in 1984 and in excess credit in 1986, and those in excess credit in 1984 and 
1986 that had no foreign tax credit carryforwards in 1986. Table 3.5  Foreign Tax Credit State 'kansitions of  U.S. Multinationals 
Data Set 
Percentage  Percentage  Percentage  Percentage 
Transit from  Transit from  Always in  Always in 
Excess Credit to  Excess Limitation to  Excess  Excess 

































































*Firms must have positive taxable income in both even years to be in each sample. 
?Figures are weighted by assets or foreign-source income in the last year of each sample period. 100  Rosanne Altshuler and T. Scott Newlon 
and out of  excess credit during  the  1980s. At  least  37 percent  of  parents 
switched states in each of our three samples, and this figure increased over 
time to reach 46 percent in the 1984-86  time period. A similar story emerges 
when these numbers are weighted by assets or foreign-source income. In each 
of the sample periods under consideration, at least 37 percent of assets and 41 
percent of foreign-source income were associated with parents that switched 
credit positions. During the 1984-86  time period, more than half of foreign- 
source income was generated by parents that changed credit position.**  These 
results indicate that, as pointed out in section 3.2, it may not be correct to 
specify the tax price for dividend remittances as taking on one of two values 
depending on the credit position of  the parent firm in that year. An expected 
tax  price  is  the  more  appropriate  concept  when  the  credit  position  may 
change.  We  will return  to this issue when we discuss the specification and 
estimation of our dividend equation. 
3.4.3 
We  now focus more closely on the tax implications of  the dividend remit- 
tances of the CFCs in our sample. We  ignore for the time being the use of 
foreign tax credit carryovers,  so the tax price of a dividend payment to the 
parent corporation takes on the values derived in section 3.2. Even with this 
restriction, we find strong evidence that U.S.  corporations in our sample were 
coordinating the level and source of dividend payments from their CFCs so as 
to reduce their U. S. and foreign tax liab 
We  would expect the probability that a CFC pays a dividend to its parent, 
and the amount of any dividend paid,  to depend on the effect the payment 
would have on the total tax liability of the CFC and the parent. For each CFC 
in the sample, we calculated the effect a dividend remittance from that CFC to 
its parent would have on tax payments by the CFC and its parent, given the 
parent’s foreign tax credit position in the absence of any dividend remittance 
from that CFC. For CFCs that paid no dividend in 1986, this calculation was 
simple, because the tax price of  the dividend payment would depend on the 
actual excess credit position of the parent. For CFCs that did pay a dividend, 
this calculation involved computing what the foreign tax credit position of the 
parent would have been if the dividend had not been paid. 
Table 3.6 summarizes the impact of dividend remittances on tax payments 
Tax Consequences of Dividend Remittances 
28.  Because the passage of the Tax Reform Act of  1986 may have made  1986 an anomalous 
year, we also weighted the figures in table 3.5 for the  1984-86  time period by  foreign-source 
income in 1984. In 1984, the total foreign-source  income of corporations in the sample was $37.5 
billion.  The proportion of  foreign-source income associated with parents remaining in the same 
credit position was 54.0 percent: 12.7 percent belonged to parents that remained in excess limita- 
tion, and 41.3 percent was associated with parents that remained in excess credit. The remaining 
proportion belonged to parents that switched credit positions: 24.1 percent transited to an excess 
credit position, and 21.9 percent transited to an excess limitation position.  As table 3.5 shows, 
these percentages do differ from those weighted by foreign-source income in 1986. This may have 
been a result of  anticipatory  behavior on the part of U.S. corporations in response to the Tax 
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Table 3.6  Tax Consequences of CFC Dividend Remittances to Their U.S. Parent 
Corporations 
CFCs Paying  CFC Dividend  Ratio of CFC 
Dividends  Payments  Dividends to: 
Number  Percentage  Dollars  Percentage  After-tax 
CFC Group  of CFCs  Number  of  Total  (millions)  of Total  Assets  Earnings 
Parents with positive taxable 
income (by tax price of 
dividend) 
Increases U .  S . taxes  1,014  193  19.0%  $  992  8.1%  1.4%  13.9% 
Does not change U.S. taxes  1,548  485  31.3  9,186  74.9  4.1  46.0 
Decreases U.S. taxes  777  303  39.0  2,088  17.0  4.4  53.4 
Increases global taxes  2,218  623  28.1  6,279  51.2  3.1  32.0 
Does not change global taxes  252  79  31.3  1,624  13.2  3.9  50.2 
Decreases global taxes  869  279  32.1  4,364  35.6  4.4  53.5 
Total  3,339  981  29.4  12,267  100.0  3.6  39.6 
Parents with tax losses 
Low-tax CFCs  761  107  14.1  712  71.7  1.6  16.2 
High-tax CFCs  305  58  19.0  281  28.3  1.8  28.4 
Total  1,066  165  15.5  992  100.0  1.7  26.4 
for the CFCs in our sample for which we calculate an average tax rate.2y  We 
partition the data into two groups of  CFCs: (1) those with parents that had 
positive U.S. taxable income and (2) those with  parents that had U.S.  tax 
losses.  For each group,  the table shows the number of  CFCs, the number 
paying dividends, the percentage paying dividends, the total amount of CFC 
dividend payments, each group’s percentage of total dividend payments, and 
the ratios of CFC dividend payments to assets and earnings, respectively. 
In  the first six rows of the table, those CFCs that had U.S.  parents with 
taxable U.S.  incomes are partitioned by whether a dividend payment from 
them to their parent would have increased, left unchanged, or decreased tax 
payments. The first three of these rows consider only the effect of a dividend 
payment on the U.S.  tax liabilities of  the parent company. Comparing the 
percentage of CFCs paying dividends and the average payout ratios across the 
different  categories  yields  striking  results.  It  appears  that  tax  incentives 
strongly affected whether a multinational chose to receive dividend remit- 
tances from a CFC. About 29.4 percent of all CFCs paid a dividend, but only 
19.0 percent of those CFCs from which dividend payments would have in- 
creased U. S. tax  liabilities actually paid dividends,  while  3 1.3 percent  of 
those CFCs whose dividend payments would not have changed U.S. tax lia- 
29.  Because they appeared to be outliers, a small group of CFCs with extremely high (above 
90 percent) calculated  average tax rates were eliminated from the sample used to generate the 
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bilities and  39.0 percent of  those CFCs whose dividends would  have  de- 
creased U.S.  tax liabilities did pay dividends.30  And  tax incentives affected 
the amount of  dividend payments as a percentage of  CFC earnings or assets 
even more than they affected the number of CFCs paying dividends. In partic- 
ular, the sixth column of the table shows that the ratio of dividend payments 
to assets for those CFCs whose dividend payments increased U.S. taxes was 
only 1.4 percent, while this ratio was 4.1 percent and 4.4 percent for CFCs 
whose dividend payments did not change or decreased U.S.  taxes, respec- 
tively. The seventh column presents similar results for the ratio of  dividend 
payments to CFC earnings. The fifth column shows that these CFC dividend 
payments generated little U.S. tax revenue; only 8.1 percent of the total divi- 
dend payments increased U.S. taxes at all, compared to  17.0 percent of  the 
payments which actually decreased U.S. taxes. 
The next three rows of table 3.6 partition CFCs by  the effect of dividend 
payments on global-that  is, both U.S.  and source-country-tax  liabilities. 
Taxes still appear to have had a strong influence on dividend remittance pat- 
terns, but the U.S. multinationals bore some taxes on 51.2 percent of these 
income flows. This occurs because remittances from CFCs with parents in 
excess credit often create a source-country withholding tax liability that is not 
offset by a reduction in U.S. taxes, because the withholding tax payment just 
creates more excess foreign tax  credit^.^' However, comparing the proportions 
of  CFCs paying dividends and CFC payout ratios yields a result similar to 
what occurs when only U.S.  tax liabilities are considered: CFCs appear to 
have been far more llkely to pay dividends and to pay larger dividends if those 
dividends bore a negative or zero tax price. Remarkably, 35.6 percent of CFC 
dividend payments appear to have decreased global tax liabilities for their 
U.S. parent corporations. 
The last three rows of  table 3.6 present results for CFCs with parents that 
had tax losses and therefore no U.S. taxes to pay. Our sample has 1,066 such 
CFCs, compared to 3,339 CFCs with parents having positive taxable income. 
Remittances from these CFCs do not incur any U.S. tax because the foreign 
taxable income they represent is offset by  domestic (or foreign branch) tax 
losses. Because there is no current U.S. tax liability, any foreign tax credit on 
the remitted income cannot be taken currently, but it may be carried forward 
or back to other tax years. 
We  might expect large remittances of  income from low-tax CFCs in this 
30.  A question arose as to how to classify those CFCs that paid a dividend large enough to 
change the foreign tax credit position of the parent. We opted to classify CFCs by the tax conse- 
quence of the first dollar of dividend payment made. Few enough CFCs in this position were in 
the sample that the results were not significantly changed by classifying CFCs by the tax conse- 
quence of the last dollar of dividend payment made. 
31.  Remittances from some CFCs incur a positive or  zero U.S. tax liability but  a negative 
global tax  liability. This can occur because host country taxes are reduced by  distributions of 
profits in countries with split-rate systems. The advance corporation tax (ACT) credit in the United 
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situation, because the parent pays no additional U.S.  tax currently, but the 
results in table 3.6 contradict this. Those CFCs paid out little in relation to 
their income and assets. For example, as a group these CFCs paid out only 
26.4 percent of their earnings, compared to 39.6 percent for those CFCs that 
had parents with positive taxable income. Particularly puzzling is the result 
that low-tax CFCs paid out less than high-tax CFCs, because firms making 
losses save U.S. tax when they receive dividends from low-tax CFCs but not 
when they receive them from high-tax CFCs. 
These results may not be as puzzling as they at first seemed to us, because 
a plausible tax motivation exists for CFCs to pay out less when their U.S. 
parents are making losses. When the parent receives a dividend from a CFC 
in this situation, it gives up a loss deduction that, according to U.S. tax rules, 
can be carried back to past years or forward to future years to offset taxable 
income and reduce taxes. In exchange for the forgone loss carryover, the par- 
ent saves the additional U.S. tax that would otherwise accrue immediately on 
the foreign income it repatriates. The parent also acquires excess foreign tax 
credits in the amount of the foreign tax paid or deemed paid on the remitted 
income. Together, the current savings in U.S. tax and the excess foreign tax 
credit are equal in dollar value to the loss carryover that the firm gives up. 
However, according to U.S. tax law, the loss deduction can be carried back up 
to three years and forward up to fifteen years, whereas the foreign tax credit 
can be carried back only two years and forward only five years. The foreign 
tax credit carryover is therefore much more likely to expire unused than is the 
loss carryover. U.S. multinationals may be reluctant to give up a loss carry- 
over that they would probably be able to use at some point in  the future in 
exchange for a smaller immediate tax gain and a foreign tax credit carryover 
that is more likely to expire unused. However, the result that low-tax CFCs 
pay out less than high-tax CFCs in this situation remains a puzzle. 
3.4.4  Estimates of the Relationship between Dividend Remittances and 
Their Tax Price 
The results reported in tables 3.3 through 3.6 suggest that taxation may 
have an important influence on dividend remittance patterns, but they do not 
allow us to gauge whether tax incentives are significant when other factors are 
taken into account. To do that, we estimated dividend equations of the follow- 
ing basic form: 
(2)  Dc = a,, + ci,TAy  + a2Y, + P'X, + y'X,  + E, , 
where D, denotes the dividend payment of CFC i to its U.S. parent corpora- 
tion; TAy denotes the tax price of dividend payments from the CFC to its 
parent; Y,  denotes CFC after-tax income; X,  is a vector of other CFC character- 
istics; X, is a vector of the characteristics of the U.S. parent; and E, is a random 
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Equation (2) is similar to the dividend equation estimated by  Hines and 
Hubbard (1990), but our estimates differ in some important ways. As we have 
noted, our specification of the tax price variable includes withholding taxes 
and takes into account variations in source-country corporate income taxation 
systems. In addition, in some of our estimates we include an additional tax 
price variable designed to reflect expected  tax price effects. We  attempt to 
capture  the  possibility  that  the  parent  firm's  excess  credit position could 
change in the future and that the use of  foreign tax credit carryovers could 
change the tax consequences of current dividend payments. We  assume that 
the larger the parent firm's excess credit position (if it is in excess credit) or 
the greater its deficit of credits (if it is in excess limitation) relative to its total 
foreign-source income, the less likely it will be to change credit position dur- 
ing the period when carryovers could be used. This led us to the following 
dividend equation: 
D,  = a,,  + a,TAX, + aFTAX, + a3Y, + p'X{ + y'X,  + E,, 
where 
(3)  ETAX,  = (TAX, - OTAXJ  e-iFTcdFs'p) 
and OTM, denotes the tax price of a dividend remittance if the parent which 
is currently in excess credit (excess limitation) were instead in excess limita- 
tion (excess credit); FTCp denotes the current total excess credit or excess 
limitation of the parent; and FSIp denotes the parent's total foreign-source in- 
come from all sources. 
Although ad hoc, this specification has three attractive properties. To illus- 
trate this, note that the probability of  switching credit positions is e so that 
the expected tax price is 
(1 -  P)TAX, + P(OTAX,) ; 
then 
Given this interpretation, the first attractive property of  the specification is 
that a,  represents the effect of the expected tax price no matter what value P 
takes on. The second attractive property is that as FTCJFSI,  gets large-that 
is, as  the parent goes further into excess credit or excess limitation and is 
therefore less likely to move out of that state in the near future-ETAX,,  and 
hence P, gets small and eventually approaches zero. The third property is that 
as the foreign tax credit position, FTC,,  approaches zero, P approaches a 
fixed number, a,/a,. 
Because over 70 percent of the CFCs in the sample pay no dividends at all, 
the dividend equations were estimated using a tobit model. The columns of 
table 3.7 report estimates of six different versions of the tobit model. Column Table 3.7  Tobit Estimates of  Tax Price Effects on CFC Dividend Remittances 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: Ratio of  CFC Dividends to CFC Assets* 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Tax price 
Expected tax price variable? 
Ratio of CFC earnings to CFC assets 
Years since CFC incorporation/lO 
Ratio of  parent dividends to parent assets 
Ratio of CFC interest paid to CFC assets 
Excess credit dummy 
Parent dummies present 
Country dummies present 
CFC industry dummies present 
Intercept 
Number of  observations 
Log likelihood 
Parameter scale factor$ 
-0.058 
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-0.217 
(0.025) 






















































*Standard errors are in parentheses. 
?The expected tax price variable is as specified in text equation (3). 
$Multiply parameter estimates by the parameter scale factor to obtain slope coefficients. 106  Rosanne Altshuler and T.  Scott Newlon 
(1) presents estimates of the basic dividend equation, including the tax price 
variable, CFC earnings, and CFC age measured by the number of years since 
incorporation. To  control for variations in CFC size, CFC dividend remit- 
tances and earnings are divided by CFC assets. Column (2) shows estimates 
of the same equation with the addition of the variable to capture the expected 
tax price effect, ETAX. To capture parent-specific effects, we included the ratio 
of parent-company dividends to assets and a set of parent dummy variables in 
the estimates reported in column (3). Column (4)  reports estimates of  the 
equation  including  fifty-nine country  dummy  variables. For  the  estimates 
shown in column (5), we included CFC interest paid divided by CFC assets 
and a dummy variable for the U.S. parent corporation’s excess credit position. 
Column (6) presents estimates of  the dividend equation with CFC industry 
dummy variables in addition to the country dummy variables. 
The estimated tax price effects on CFC dividend remittances are negative 
and significant in each model, suggesting that the larger the tax price of re- 
ceiving dividends from a CFC, the lower the dividend payment from that CFC 
will be. Interestingly, adding the expected tax price variable improves the es- 
timates overall and increases the estimated tax price coefficient substantially, 
from -  0.058 in column (1) to -  0.160 in column (2). The expected tax price 
effect appears to be larger and more significant than the estimated effect of the 
simple tax price specification used in the column (1) estimates. 
The estimated parameters for the other variables present in these, and the 
other, specifications have unsurprising signs. Higher CFC earnings increase 
CFC distributions. CFC dividends increase with CFC age, a result predicted 
by  some models of multinational behavior under taxation with a foreign tax 
credit and deferral (including Newlon 1987; Sinn 1990). 
The estimates shown in column (3) are of interest in light of results reported 
in Hines and Hubbard (1990) and Hines (1991). Hines and Hubbard (1990) 
found a strong positive relationship between CFC dividend payments and par- 
ent company dividend payments. They suggest that this relationship may be 
due to cash flow constraints, because parent firms might need more internally 
generated funds when they  are making distributions to  their shareholders. 
Hines (1991) found a strong positive effect of foreign earnings in estimates of 
dividend payout equations for U.S. corporations. He is uncertain as to the 
reason for this relationship but suggests that it is consistent with a signaling 
view of dividends. In an earlier version of this paper, we presented estimates 
that were consistent with these findings: parent dividend payments had a large 
positive coefficient when added to our CFC dividend equations. However, the 
results reported  in  column (3) show that  when  separate parent effects are 
added to the equation, the relationship between parent and CFC dividend pay- 
ments disappears.  It  appears that  the parent dividend variable may simply 
have  been  capturing some omitted parent characteristics. In any case, the 
presence or absence of these and other parent variables does not affect the 
estimated coefficients on the other variables substantially. 
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from  -0.160  to  -0.217.  Although not  reported in  the table, many of  the 
estimated country effects are significantly different from the omitted country 
effect, Canada. For example, significant negative effects were estimated for 
the  United  Kingdom  (- 0.160),  France  ( -  0.073),  and  the  Netherlands 
( -  0.083). We  found no evidence of a strong tax haven effect independent of 
the tax price effect. Whereas Hong Kong and the Cayman Islands have signif- 
icant negative country effects of -  0.097 and -  0.158, respectively, the Neth- 
erlands Antilles have a significant positive effect (0.108), and other tax havens 
generally have significant country effects. Country risk factors may be evident 
in  the positive country effects on dividend remittances found for Panama 
(0.089), South Africa (0.074), and the Philippines (0.145). 
In order to control for differences in CFC capital structure, we included the 
ratio of  CFC interest payments to CFC assets in  the estimates reported in 
column (5).32  The more debt financed a CFC, the greater its interest payments 
and the less funds may  be available for dividend payments. The estimated 
coefficient on this variable has the expected negative sign, but it is not statis- 
tically significant. Including this variable does not change the estimated tax 
price effect. 
A potential problem with our estimated tax effects is that they may measure 
no more than the fact that CFCs with parents in excess credit paid larger divi- 
dends. To  test for this possibility, the estimates reported in column (5) also 
include a dummy variable equal to one if  the parent is in excess credit and 
zero otherwise. While the estimated coefficient on this variable is positive and 
significant, the  estimated tax  price effect reported  in  column (5) remains 
highly significant and virtually unchanged from the column (4) estimate. 
Our results are robust to the inclusion of other variables in the equation. For 
example, column (6) reports estimates of  the dividend equation containing 
twenty-seven  CFC  industry dummy  variables  in  addition  to  the  country 
dummy  The results are largely the same as in the other estimates.34 
We  have also estimated these equations including terms that interact the tax 
price variables with the CFC earnings variable. Such interactive terms are 
frequently included in empirical estimates of dividend equations. The results 
from those estimates are qualitatively the same as those presented in table 3.7, 
although the estimated tax price effects evaluated at the variable means are 
actually somewhat larger when the interactive terms are included. We  present 
the results without the interactive terms because they are somewhat easier to 
evaluate visually. 
A potential endogeneity problem associated with our tax price variable be- 
32.  Because CFC interest payments are an endogenous variable, it would be best to instrument 
them on some exogenous variable. However, we could not find suitable instrumental variables in 
our data. 
33.  These dummy variables were created using groupings of the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) 
industry classifications,  which correspond fairly closely to two-digit standard industrial classifi- 
cations (SICS). 
34. We have also estimated the same equation with parent industry effects, but the results were 
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comes apparent if  one examines the formulas in table 3.1. Specifically, the 
value of the tax price variable depends on the size of the CFC’s dividend pay- 
ment when the host country has a split-rate or imputation tax system. We  used 
instrumental variables estimates to evaluate whether this is an important prob- 
lem. We  instrumented the tax price variables on their values evaluated when 
dividend payments are zero. The instrumental variables estimates were very 
close to those reported in table 3.7, so it appears that this source of endogene- 
ity in the tax variable is not important. 
The results reported in table 3.7 show that the tax price of a dividend remit- 
tance has a significant negative impact on CFC dividend remittances. The 
estimates from columns (4) and (5) indicate that at the mean of the variables 
an increase in the tax price of  1 percentage point would decrease the dividend 
payout ratio by about 0.054 percentage points, which translates into approxi- 
mately a 1.5  percent decrease in dividend payments. This effect may not seem 
large, but given that the tax price of  remittances varied enormously across 
CFCs within the sample (from less than -  300 percent to over 50 percent), the 
estimates indicate that tax incentives did have dramatic impacts on dividend 
remittance patterns. 
As explained above, one can calculate implied values for the probability of 
switching credit position from our estimates. When the stock of excess credits 
equals zero, an estimate of this probability is given by the coefficient on the 
expected tax price variable. Using the parameter estimate from our preferred 
specifications in columns (4),  (5), and (6), the implied probability of  switch- 
ing credit position is around 0.62. This probability may seem large, but con- 
sidered in light of the substantial shifts in credit position shown in table 3.5 it 
appears to be more reasonable. In particular, note that table 3.5 shows that at 
least 46 percent of the parent corporations switched credit position during the 
period  1984-86.  Over the seven-year period around 1986 during which ex- 
cess credits could be carried back or forward, the percentage of firms switch- 
ing credit position would probably be a lot higher. 
Our results appear to suggest a greater and more significant tax price effect 
on dividend remittances than that found by Hines and Hubbard (1990) in their 
estimates of a similar equation. This may be due to our improved specification 
of the tax price variable or to differences in the data used. 
Caution should be exercised in interpreting the estimated coefficients on our 
tax price variable. These estimates do not necessarily show the effect of  tax 
policy changes on the aggregate level of dividend remittances from CFCs. 
What the figures show is that firms tend to structure their CFC dividend remit- 
tances so that they minimize taxes at the margin. If, given the income flows 
from other sources, the tax price of  a dividend remittance from a particular 
CFC to its U.S. parent is low, our results suggest that the U.S. parent is more 
likely to receive a dividend payment from that CFC. But the tax price of  a 
dividend remittance from one CFC will frequently depend on the foreign in- 
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sources. Because we have not estimated the parameters of a model that would 
simultaneously determine the levels of all of  these income flows, our esti- 
mates will not capture all the effects of policy changes on aggregate dividend 
remittances. 
3.5  Summary and Implications 
Our results suggest that U.S. corporations are able to manipulate the flows 
of  income from their CFCs in order to reduce the global tax on their foreign- 
source income. They are able to take advantage of  deferral and the overall 
limitation on the foreign tax credit to avoid paying much U.S. tax on their 
foreign  The incentives for tax avoidance distort the timing and the 
source of remittances of income from abroad. 
To  the extent that it merely reflects high foreign taxes paid by U.S. corpo- 
rations on their foreign-source income, the fact that U.S. multinational cor- 
porations avoid paying much U.S. tax on foreign-source income is not neces- 
sarily in conflict with U.S. policy goals. The foreign tax credit is, after all, 
meant to relieve double taxation. However, our results indicate that the low 
U. S. tax payments on this income are not merely the result of uniformly high 
foreign tax rates. Instead, they appear to arise to a significant extent from the 
ability of  U.S.  firms to  cross-credit between different  sources of  income 
within the overall limitation on the foreign tax credit. In addition to lowering 
U.S.  tax  revenues, this may  also affect the extent to which the tax system 
preserves capital-export neutrality.  With cross-crediting, firms with  excess 
credits have a tax incentive to invest in low-tax countries rather than in the 
United States or elsewhere, thereby violating capital-export neutrality. How- 
ever, ignoring the effects of  deferral,  cross-crediting may tend to preserve 
capital-export neutrality for firms in excess limitation, because the tax conse- 
quences of earning income in high-tax countries and low-tax countries are the 
same. Whether this is, or should be, compatible with U.S. policy goals is an 
open question. 
The current policy implications of  our results should be qualified by  the 
major changes in the tax law that have occurred since 1986. By increasing the 
number of separate limitation baskets, the Tax Reform Act of  1986 tightened 
up on the use of cross-crediting. Our results indicate that the concerns that led 
to these further restrictions on cross-crediting were justified,  whatever the 
merits of the particular measures that were adopted. The 1986 act also low- 
ered the U.S. corporate income tax rate substantially, which may have caused 
a much greater portion of the foreign-source income of U.S. multinationals to 
generate excess credits.  Another possible limitation of  this analysis is that 
1986 may have been an anomalous year due to the anticipation of the tax law 
35.  The income does bear shareholder-level taxes when it is distributed to the U.S.  parent 
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changes that took effect over the following two years. Slemrod (1990a) pre- 
sents balance-of-payments data suggesting that there were such effects on 
multinational income flows in  1986. We  plan to investigate the anticipatory 
impacts and subsequent effects of the I986 tax legislation by linking our 1986 
data to data from earlier and later years when the first multinational tax data 
from the period following 1986 become available. 
Appendix A 
Derivation of  Tax Prices  for Nonclassical 
Corporate Income Tax Systems 
In  this appendix, we present the derivations of  the tax prices for dividend 
payments from CFCs in  countries with  split-rate and imputation corporate 
income tax systems. 
Tax  Prices under Split-Rate Systems 
Under split-rate systems, there are different corporate tax rates for undistri- 
buted and distributed profits, denoted in the text as 7,  and T~,  respectively. The 
total tax paid by CFC i to its country of residence before withholding taxes is 
T, = ~,(y,  -  Dc)  + TPl , 
where  Y, denotes the  CFC’s  pretax  income  and  Dt denotes  its  dividend 
payment to its U.S. parent corporation. Let T, represent the source-country 
average tax rate on the CFC’s distributed and undistributed profits before with- 
holding taxes, equal to T,/Y,,  which is the tax rate used for the dividend gross- 
up and foreign tax credit calculation. If the parent is in excess credit, there is 
no additional U.S. tax to pay on dividends, and so the tax price of  a dividend 
remittance must be zero. If  the parent is in excess limitation, the U.S. tax 
payable on the dividend remittance is 
T,,  = Dt[(T -  T,)/(1 -  7,) -  O,] . 
where w, represents the source-country withholding tax rate on dividend pay- 
ments out of the country. Differentiating this with respect to D,  yields the U.S. 
tax price of dividend remittances when the parent is in excess limitation: 
dTu,/dD, = (T -  ~~)/(1  -  7,) -  O, + (D,/Y,)(T,  -  .rd)(l -  ~)/(1  -  T,)~  . 
The global tax liability created by  a dividend remittance is the sum of the 
U.S. and the foreign tax liabilities. If  the parent is in excess limitation, that 
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TG = (7, -  TJD,  + D,(T -  ~,)/(l  -  7,)  . 
The global tax price is then 
dTG/dD,  = T~ -  T~ + (T -  ~~)/(l  -  TJ + 
(D/YL)(Tu  -  Td)(l -  T)/(1 -  T,)2 . 
For a parent in excess credit, the global tax liability associated with the divi- 
dend payment is simply 
TG  = (Td -  ‘u  + wi)D1  9 
so the tax price is 
dTG/dD,  = T~ -  T,,  + wz  . 
Tax Prices under the U.K. Imputation System 
Under the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty, the tax credit provided to U.S. shareholders 
for advanced corporation tax (ACT) on distributed profits is one-half of the 
credit given domestic shareholders.  The United  Kingdom applies its with- 
holding tax to both the dividend payment and the ACT credit. The United 
States considers the tax credit paid to be part of the grossed-up dividend. In 
addition, for foreign tax credit purposes, the United States treats the reduction 
by one-half in the credit given to U.S. shareholders as an additional payment 
of U.K. corporate income tax by the U.K. CFC. 
Denoting the tax credit given to U.S.  shareholders for ACT as 0,, actual 
CFC tax payments to the United Kingdom are 
T, = c,Y, - 0p, + w,(l  + 0,)D,  , 
where c, is the rate of tax on undistributed profits. Taxes deemed by the United 
States to have been paid by the CFC before withholding taxes are 
‘dp  = c,yt  + ‘Pi 
The average U.K. tax rate used for the dividend gross-up and the foreign tax 
credit is 
T, = Tdp/Y,  . 
Given these definitions, we can derive the U.S. tax liability on a dividend 
payment  from a U.K.  CFC after the foreign tax credit.  If the U.S.  parent 
corporation is in excess credit, the U.S. tax liability is zero. If the parent is in 
excess limitation, the U.S. tax liability is 
T”S  = (1 + 0,P,[(T -  TZM1 -  7,) -  w,I 
Differentiating this expression produces the tax price of dividend remittances 
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dTuddD, = (1 + 0,)[(T -  T,)/(1 -  7,) -  W, -  O,(D/Yz)(l -  T)/(1 -  T,)’]  . 
The global tax liability created by  the dividend payment for a parent in 
excess credit is 
TG  = [(I  + 8JWL -  0,P,  9 
and the corresponding tax price is 
dTG/dD,  = (1 + 0,)~~  - 0, , 
The global tax liability for a parent in excess limitation is 
TG = (1 -I  e,)D,(T -  TI)/(l -  7,) - 0p, , 
and the associated tax price is 
dT,/dD,  = (1 + 0,)[(7 -  ~,)/(1  -  7,) -  O,(D/Y,)(l -  ~)/(1  -  T,)’]  - 0, . 
Appendix B 
Data Issues 
Problems in Imputing CFC-Specific Average Tax Rates from 
Tax Return Data 
Calculating the tax price of  dividend repatriations from the subsidiary in- 
formation return (Form 5471) often requires more information than is  re- 
ported. This is the case for CFCs that report negative earnings and profits, 
receive tax refunds from host countries, repatriate dividends in excess of cur- 
rent earnings and profits, or receive remittances from their own subsidiaries. 
As described below, to reduce measurement errors we eliminated CFCs in 
some of these situations from our analysis. In other instances, we opted to 
include observations after careful analysis. 
We  eliminated two groups of CFCs that are apt to have true gross-up rates 
that differ from average foreign tax rates. The first group were CFCs with 
negative earnings and profits. For these CFCs, the rate used to gross up divi- 
dends for the purpose of the foreign tax credit is the rate that applied when the 
earnings from which dividends are distributed were generated. No informa- 
tion on this rate is available because it is a function of past tax rates. 
Another problem arose due to the existence of  negative CFC foreign in- 
come tax payments. CFCs may receive tax refunds from host countries that 
reduce tax payments on current earnings and profits. This causes no problem 
for the imputation of average tax rates for CFCs that paid positive foreign 
taxes but leaves us with an indeterminate gross-up rate for CFCs with negative 
foreign income tax payments. Because there is insufficient information to im- 
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There are two nuances in the tax law that complicate the calculation of the 
gross-up rate for CFCs. First, prior to  1987, if  a CFC’s dividend payment 
exceeded its current-year after-tax profits, then the excess was considered to 
have been distributed from the accumulated profits of previous years, starting 
with the next previous year and moving backward. The gross-up rate on the 
excess remittance is therefore calculated based on the foreign taxes that were 
paid  on those prior-year profits. Second, if  a CFC  itself receives dividend 
payments from a subsidiary of its own-termed  a lower-tier CFC-then  any 
dividend payment from the first-tier CFC to its U.S. parent is considered to be 
paid proportionately out of  its own profits and the profits of  the lower-tier 
CFC. Therefore, the gross-up rate is based on a weighted average of the aver- 
age tax rates of the first-tier CFC and the lower-tier CFC, with the weights 
determined by the fraction of the first-tier CFC’s profits accounted for by the 
dividend from the lower-tier CFC. After careful analysis, we chose to have 
our sample include CFCs in both of these situations. Imputed average tax rates 
were calculated by  dividing current-year tax payments by current-year earn- 
ings and profits. A description of the procedures we used to determine if the 
inclusion of these two groups of CFCs caused any bias in our results appears 
in the next section of this appendix. 
In summary, we included in our sample those CFCs that received dividend 
payments from lower-tier CFCs and CFCs that paid out dividends in excess of 
current-year earnings and profits. Excluded from our sample are CFCs that 
made negative foreign income tax payments and CFCs that reported negative 
earnings and profits. Our sample consisted of 340 parents with positive world- 
wide income. These corporations owned 4,475 CFCs with assets large enough 
to be included in the top 7,500 CFCs. Of this group of CFCs, 884 had nega- 
tive earnings and profits and  159 received tax refunds from host countries. 
Eliminating these CFCs resulted in a decrease of  $601 million of  dividend 
remittances. These omissions accounted for less than 5 percent of the almost 
$13 billion of  dividend payments  from  CFCs  to  parents  included  in  the 
sample. Our sample was made up of the remaining 3,410 CFCs, of which 333 
paid out dividends in excess of current earnings and profits and 420 received 
dividends from lower-tier CFCs. Dividend remittances total $12.3 billion; 
$2.8 million of  dividends were remitted from CFCs that paid out dividends 
above current earnings and profits, and $6.2 million of dividends were remit- 
ted from CFCs receiving dividend payments from lower-tier CFCs. 
Potential Sources of Bias 
CFCs that Received Dividends from Lower-Tier Subsidiaries 
CFCs receiving dividends from lower-tier CFCs may or may not remit div- 
idends to U.S. parent corporations. To determine whether dividend remittance 
patterns differed between CFCs with lower-tier remittances and those without, 
we separated from the sample those CFCs for which lower-tier dividend pay- 114  Rosanne Altshuler and T. Scott Newlon 
ments constituted more than 10 percent of earnings and profits. We then gen- 
erated tables 3.3-3.6  for both samples and compared the results. Although 
CFCs that received substantial amounts of  dividends from lower-tier CFCs 
were more likely to make dividend payments to U.S. parents and paid out 
more dividends, we found that the relationship between tax prices and divi- 
dend payments did not differ across the two samples. As a result, we included 
in our tabulation and econometric work all CFCs that derived income from 
lower-tier dividend payments. 
CFCs That Paid Out Dividends in Excess of Current-Year After-tax Profits 
CFCs that paid out dividends in excess of current earnings and profits are 
also a potential source of measurement error. We  compared tabulations for 
this group of CFCs with all other CFCs paying dividends and determined that 
including this set of CFCs did not systematically  bias our results. 
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